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The Art Law Report

Providing timely updates and commentary on legal issues in the museum and visual arts communities

Restitution Case Against Czech Republic and Museums Dismissed

Posted in Restitution, World War II

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida has dismissed—for a second time—a lawsuit filed there by former attorney Edward Fagan seeking the restitution of various works of art in the National Gallery in Prague and the Museum of Decorative Arts in Prague.  A novel strategy of bringing the case not by the alleged heirs, but rather by a former lawyer in cooperation with those alleged heirs, was rejected by the court on its own initiative. 

In April, an entity entitled “Victims of Holocaust Art Theft” filed a complaint against the two Czech museums, and the Czech Republic itself, alleging that the collection of Richard and Regina Popper had been looted by the Nazis, and that some of that collection was now held by the two defendant museums.  The Poppers were Czech collectors and Jews who were deported and murdered during the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia. 

Invoking the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s provision conferring jurisdiction over claims concerning property taken in violation of international law, and alleging various acts of predicate commercial activity by the defendants, “Victims” alleged that it had acquired an unspecified interest in the Popper Collection from a man named Michal Klepetář, an heir of the Poppers.  Fagan described himself as a “co-owner” of the entity, along (implicitly) with Klepetář.  The complaint was filed without a lawyer (pro se) by a man named Edward Fagan. 

Before the defendants had to do anything, the court itself directed “Victims” to obtain a lawyer.  In Florida, as in most states, while an individual person always has the right to represent him- or herself, the same is not true of corporations and other legal entities.  “Victims” did not obtain a lawyer by the deadline imposed by the Court, and the case was dismissed.  Fagan filed a motion asking for permission to proceed with himself as the plaintiff, and Klepetář submitted a letter explaining the relationship, but the motion was denied.

At the same time, however, Fagan filed another complaint, opening another case.  The allegations were the same, but this time Fagan himself was the plaintiff.  It was he, the complaint explained, that had acquired the interest from Klepetář, so he now brought suit as the party in interest.

This was, needless to say, an interesting tactic.  There is nothing procedurally odd or improper in and of itself about acquiring rights from another party and then bringing a lawsuit based on those rights.  It is known as assigning a cause of action, and it happens all the time in the insurance context, for example.  Two things made Fagan’s attempt stand out, however.  First, even in its amended form, the complaint made repeated efforts to vindicating the rights of others (i.e., the Popper heirs) beyond Fagan himself.  Even absent any other complications, those allegations would tend to suggest that those other heirs also needed to be plaintiffs (otherwise, the defendants would be left to defend the first suit, and then possibly a second by heirs unhappy with the result of the first).

The second notable difference was Fagan’s own history.  Once a prominent lawyer in New York on behalf of a variety of Holocaust-related plaintiffs, he was later disbarred.  That means that unlike another lawyer from New York or elsewhere, Fagan not appear before the court representing anyone other than himself.

Taking these two factors together, the Florida court dismissed the case on its own initiative, meaning that the Czech defendants never even had to appear and defend themselves.  Citing the representative nature of the allegations, and Fagan’s past, the court determined that the case could not proceed.  Unlike the first case in July, the court did not give Fagan a chance to correct the complaint or obtain an attorney, it dismissed the complaint and closed the case. 

Fagan may yet appeal that ruling, or file a similar claim again.  For now, however, what looked to be a prominent case has ended not with a bang, but a whimper.

New Sullivan & Worcester LLP Client Advisory on Consignment Law in New York

Posted in Consignment

Please see our most recent client advisory from the Art & Museum Law Group at Sullivan & Worcester LLP.  Building on recent posts here, the advisory addresses recent statutory changes to and judicial interpretation of the law governing sales on consignment, including auctions in particular.

German Art Law Updates from the Dispute Resolution in Germany Blog

Posted in Copyright, Forgery, Intellectual Property

For those of us trying to follow art law developments in Germany, particularly to get access to original source and court documents in German, Peter Bert’s Dispute Resolution in Germany Blog is a terrific source.  Between the Hans Sachs collection case and the contuing fallout from the Wolfgang Beltracchi forgery scandal and the fictional “Jägers Collection,” Germany has had a busy year of art law prominence, particularly with regard to forgery issues.  Two recent posts bear reading, both of which attach the original court opinions in German, for their interesting analysis. 

The first concerns the recent finding by a Düsseldorf court that the auction house Lempertz bears responsibility to a defrauded buyer of the painting “Red Painting with Horses” (Rotes Bild mit Pferden), described as a lost work of Heinrich Campendonk.  Lempertz has stated its intention to appeal.

The second post concerns another order in Düsseldorf compelling the destruction of a painting that the court found to be an unauthorized reproduction of a Jörg Immendorf painting, rather than an original.  As the Dispute Resolution in Germany blog points out, under German copyright law (Urhebergesetz), a plaintiff can request destruction of an infringing work, to be considered based on the proportionality of that severe remedy. 

Both posts, and the blog, are highly commended.

Art Law Day at NYU Next Friday, November 9, 2012

Posted in Appraisal, Connoisseurship, Events

Although this week’s Restitution and Repatriation conference at DePaul was washed out by Hurricane Sandy, another terrific event is on the horizon next week.  “Art Law Day” at New York University, hosted by the Appraisers Association of America, will be held on November 9, 2012 at NYU’s Kimmel Center.  The condensed schedule  from the event’s website is below.  Wishing everyone in New York continued safety, we hope to see you there.

  • Keynote Address An Introduction to Moral Rights.
  • What are Moral Rights? Presenter: Judith Bresler, Withers Bergman, LLP. Intro: Ron Fiamma, Chartis Private Client Group.
  • Moral Rights and the Law  Moderator: John Cahill, Lynn & Cahill LLP. Panelists: Gloria Velandia, GV Art Conservation; Magdalena Dabrowski, Independent Curator and Art Consultant; and Christiane Fischer, AXA Art Insurance Corporation. Intro: Yuri Yanchyshyn, Period Furniture Conservation, LLC.
  • Authenticity Issues and the Law Moderator: Michael Ward Stout, Stout, Thomas & Johnson. Panelists: Peter Stern, McLaughlin & Stern, LLP; Sharon Flescher, IFAR; and Jack Flam, Dedalus Foundation, Inc.; and Judith L. Pearson, ARIS Title Insurance Corporation. Intro: Jane C. H. Jacob, AAA, Jacob Fine Art.
  • Art Financing and the Law Moderator: Christopher A. Marinello, The Art Loss Register. Panelists: Amy J. Goldrich, Lynn & Cahill; Elizabeth von Habsburg, Winston Art Group; Nicola Walter, J.P. Morgan Securities. Intro: Dorit Straus, Chubb Group of Insurance Companies LLP.
  • Philanthropy and the Law Moderator: Ralph Lerner, Withers Bergman, LLP. Panelists: Holland Dunn, Aurora Advisory Group; Donn Zaretzky, John Silberman Associates; and Karin Gross, IRS. Intro: Ella Newman, ETN Associates.
  • Art Law Day Reception, Rosenthal Pavilion.

Auction Consignors’ Names Must be Disclosed in New York: an Art Twist on a Very Old Law

Posted in Collections, Consignment, Legislation

It is a busy fall for consignment law in New York.  News has been making the rounds this month about a decision by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, New York’s intermediate appeals court.  The Appellate Division ruled that an auctioneer must disclose the name of any owner who has consigned the work for sale, or a sale against a successful bidder cannot be enforced.  The auction world is in an uproar, but the result actually derives from a version of a very old law called the Statute of Frauds about what has to be in writing for a contract to be enforceable, for reasons that have nothing to do with art or auctions.

A few years ago, the William J. Jenack auction house in Chester, New York, auctioned for sale an object described as “Fine Russian Silver/Enamel Covered Box with Gilt Interior, Signed I.P. Khlebnikov, 19th Century. Height 1½”; Top 2½” x 3 5/8″,” which apparently came to be seen as the work of renowned silversmith Ivan Petrovich Khlebnikov.  The high bidder was a man named Albert Rabizadeh, but after the sale Rabizadeh did not pay. 

A recap of the typical auction/payment process is informative: after a buyer goes to cash out with the auction clerk, the buyer gets an invoice. That invoice will ordinarily include details like the date, the bidder’s name/number, and the winning bid.  If the work was sold on consignment, sometimes the owner’s name will be included too.  Rabizadeh’s invoice stated only that the consignor was “consignor #428.”

Jenack sued Rabizadeh, presumably on the argument that he breached the contract to buy the object.  Jenack won, and after some procedural wrangling over the damages to be paid relative to the subsequent resale, the case was appealed again. 

The Appellate Division focused on New York General Obligations Law § 5-701, the New York version of what is known as the Statute of Frauds.  Dating to medieval England, the Statute of Frauds is in fact the statute actually designed to prevent fraud, codifying what kinds of agreements have to be in writing to be enforceable.  Until enacted in American states, it was not even a statute, but a doctrine of English common law.  The most common (in other states as well) are the sale of land, or agreements that cannot be performed within a year.  New York, as elsewhere, has added certain other kinds of agreements the legislature determined are better enforced only in writing, ostensibly because it reduces confusion over what the agreement was.

Here, § 5-701(a)(6) is at issue, governing agreements for “goods sold at public auction.”  The statute requires that where the auctioneer makes a record at the time of the sale with ”the name of the purchaser, and the name of the person on whose account the sale was made, such memorandum is equivalent in effect to a note of the contract or sale, subscribed by the party to be charged therewith.”  In other words, an auction record that contains the name of the seller and the name of the buyer is a contract that can be enforced consistent with the Statute of Frauds.

The Appellate Division considered the implications of this, and ruled that by extension, an auction record that does not contain the name of the seller (the consignor) is not a contract consistent with § 5-701(a)(6).  Whether or not it is “common practice” to name the auctioneer rather than the consignor, the former is not the “party to be charged”, the owner/consignor is. 

Auctioneers are understandably taken aback by this as it relates to what everyone in the case agreed was common practice, particularly given the central place New York holds for auctions.  Commentators have urged on an appeal to the Court of Appeals on the grounds that this result is a major threat to the way auction houses do business.  They should not necessarily expect a reversal, however.  The Court of Appeals will not be considering the practical consequence of the lower ruling, it will consider only if the Appellate Division applied the statute correctly (if the Court of Appeals even takes the case at all, which is purely discretionary).  The other side of the coin from idea that a winning bidder can be compelled to pay for and buy an object under a contract is that the seller is on the hook too.  But for that to be a binding agreement, it has to satisfy the contract, and that reasoning seems unlikely to change.

Clearly, anyone selling art (or other objects) on consignment should review their policies and practices and, if concerned by the result, consider legal advice on how to move ahead.

Restitution and Repatriation at DePaul University on Monday, October 29, 2012

Posted in Cultural Property, Restitution

Looking forward to Monday’s conference in Chicago at DePaul University College of Law, Center for Art, Museum & Cultural Heritage Law, entitled “Restitution and Repatriation: the Return of Cultural Objects.”  Lynn Nicholas, author of The Rape of Europa is the keynote speaker.  If you like what you see at the Art Law Report-or even if you don’t-I hope you will introduce yourself.  I expect good attendance from some heavy hitters in the field. 

See you in Chicago.

Copyright Office is Seeking Comment on Resale Royalty Legislation

Posted in Copyright

The Art Law Report’s very first post was on the revival of efforts to pass federal legislation on resale royalties, yet there was little movement after that.  Earlier this year, the California Resale Royalty Act was struck down on constitutional grounds, a case now on appeal.

As a possible sign of movement, the Copyright has published a notice saying that it has been asked by Congress to solicit comment on possible droit de suite legislation.  If you have an opinion, here is your chance to be heard until December 5, 2012.

New Perspective on Senate Bill 2212

Posted in Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act, Senate Bill 2212, Uncategorized

Our prior commentary has expressed support for Senate Bill 2212, the Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act.  The bill remains stalled in the Senate Judicary Committee.

A new post last week by Nikki Georgopulos at plundered art (one of our favorite resources) takes a very well-written, opposing view.  A must-read for the well-informed on the topic.

“Nite Moves” Loses in the Court of Appeals—Lap Dancing is Not Art in New York

Posted in First Amendment

The New York Court of Appeals has rejected the must-watched effort by Nite Moves, a Albany-area strip club, to exempt itself from sales tax on the grounds that exotic dancing was protectable First Amendment expression.  The high court ruled that the club failed to carry its burden to prve that the dances were “choreographed performances.”  The quote of the day, however, goes to the dissent:

“Perhaps for similar reasons, I do not read Hustler magazine.  I would rather read the New Yorker. I would be appalled however, if the state were to exact from Hustler a tax that the New Yorker did not have to pay on the ground that what appears in Hustler is insufficiently ‘cultural or artistic.’”

Expect similar know-it-when-you-see it analysis in any copycat cases.

Second Circuit Rules Schiele Drawing Not Stolen by Nazis

Posted in Cultural Property, Restitution, World War II

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed the judgment against David Bakalar concerning ownership of the drawing Seated Woman with Bent Left Leg (Torso).  It is a notable decision first and foremost because it affirms the District Court ruling on the merits of whether the drawing was stolen by the Nazis from the Austrian-Jewish collector Fritz Grünbaum—finding that it was not stolen.  Such a ruling is a rarity among wartime restitution cases, the overwhelming majority of which continue to founder on statutes of limitations and jurisdictional defenses.  Ironically, even though the court ruled that the work was not stolen and that the current owner could not prove good title, the current owner still prevailed.  The details are the key to understanding this case, best described in the District Court decision that the Appeals Court affirmed. 

Bakalar is the current owner of the Schiele drawing, having purchased it in good faith in 1964 from the Galerie St. Etienne in New York.  Bakalar sought a declaratory judgment that he holds good title to the painting. 

The background of the drawing from there gets more complicated.  The District Court found that Grünbaum owned the 1917 work prior to the start of World War II.  In 1938 Franz Kieslinger, a Nazi art appraiser, inventoried Grünbaum’s collection, but the Court could not determine if the drawing at issue was still a part of it.  Based on deposition testimony, the Court found that the drawing was sold to the Galerie Gutekunst in 1956 by Mathilde Lukacs, which later that same year sold it to the Galerie St. Etienne from which Bakalar purchased it.

Fritz Grünbaum’s own fate is better known, unfortunately.  In 1938 he was arrested and imprisoned at Dachau.  There, he signed a power of attorney in favor of his wife, Elisabeth.  Fritz died in Dachau in 1941, and Elisabeth was later interned and died in another concentration camp. 

The defendants were related to him in various respects.  Milos Vavra is the nephew of Fritz Grünbaum’s niece (his sister Elise Zozuli’s daughter).  Zozuli lived in Czechoslovakia after the war, and, according to the Court, made various efforts to obtain the return of Grünbaum property.  Various correspondence in the 1950s made reference to the “Brussels sisters,” taken to be Mathilde Lukacs—Elisabeth’s last surviving sibling—after which Zozuli made reference to the matter being “settled.”

The other plaintiff, Leon Fischer, is a relation of Elisabeth.  Elisabeth was survived by four siblings, one of whom (Max Herzl) survived the war but died in 1946.  Leon Fischer is his grandson, daughter of Rene Herzl. 

According to the Court, Fischer’s parents and grandparents remained in contact with Lukacs, even visiting her once in 1959.  No record exists of Fischer’s parents ever making a claim to the Grünbaum estate. 

An Austrian court declared Vavra and Fischer to be the Grünbaum heirs om 1999 and awarded each a 50% interest in the Grünbaum estate.  Apparently in 1963, a German court had declared two cousins of Fritz Grünbaum (Paul and Rita Reift) to be his heirs.  The Reifs were themselves unsuccessful in trying to win the return of a Schiele painting, Dead City III, from the Museum of Modern Art in New York. 

The Bakalar case was tried once, applying Swiss law, which allows a good faith purchaser to take title even if the object was stolen when it was acquired.  Applying that law, the Court found that Bakalar had good title to the drawing.  The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals ordered that New York law, which is quite different, must be applied.  In New York, “a thief cannot pass good title.”  Thus, if Vavra and Fischer made a threshold showing that they have an arguable claim to the drawing, Bakalar would bear the burden to prove that it was not stolen.

To make that showing, the defendants argued two theories.  First, that the drawing may have been stolen by the Nazis, or second, that Lukacs never acquired good title that she could pass to Bakalar. 

The Court found that the most reasonable inference from the fact that the drawing was in Grünbaum’s possession before his arrest and with Lukacs in 1956 was that the drawing remained in the family’s possession the entire time.  The alternative—that it was looted but returned to his sister-in-law, seemed implausible.  The mere fact that the collection was inventoried—almost certainly a prelude to the intended looting of it—there was no evidence that the confiscation ever took place.  Taking all this together, the Court found as a matter of fact that the drawing was not looted by the Nazis. 

Next, the Court addressed the argument that even if not stolen, Lukacs did not hold good title.  Bakalar responded to that argument by suggesting that the most logical explanation was that Lukacs obtained the work during her lifetime as a gift.  Defendants (relying on a passing observation from the Court of Appeals during the first appeal) suggested that no one could have made a gift of the painting, because the power of attorney that Grünbaum signed in Dachau was made under duress and void (and, therefore, any disposition thereafter by anyone other than Grünbaum was ineffective).  The District Court rejected this argument, pointing out that earlier cases cited for that proposition were ones in which the collected had “sold” the painting to the Nazis themselves, the very act of looting, which was later voided.  The District Court did hold, though, that however plausible the notion that Lukacs had received the drawing as a gift, there was no evidence at all of how she got it or a sufficient legal argument that she would have come to it as an heir under Austrian law.  As the party bearing the burden of proof, Bakalar failed, in the Court’s view, to prove that Lukacs ever acquired good title to the drawing. 

Yet Bakalar won the case on the defense of “laches.”  In layman’s terms, laches is the equivalent sitting on your hands, and failing to enforce your rights in a way that prejudices your opponent.  The District Court went through the history of Vavra’s and Fischer’s families’ awareness of the drawing, and their failure to seek to claim it.  The lack of any claim to the work while it changed hands ultimately prejudiced Bakalar, the District Court held, enough so that his defense carried the day and he won the trial.  Since this was not a preliminary determination, but a trial, the court was charged with actually addressing and ruling on the competing facts.  That is significant because it requires more deferential review by the Court of Appeals, and without evidence of “clear error” by the District Court (as opposed to a re-weighing of the evidence), the Court of Appeals had little difficulty in upholding the result.

This is one of the very few restitution claims that has made it to trial—twice—yet the claimant came away empty handed again.  Although there was a ruling on the merits about whether the work was stolen, the outcome actually makes sense.  As the Court noted, it is hard to imagine a scenario where the drawing was looted, yet ended up back in the same family that was part of the persecuted minority.  And, despite the objections that are often raised to laches as a defense, perhaps the simplest explanation really is correct, that the family never sought to get the drawing back because it was sold by the person who had the right to do so (Lukacs).  The take here is that claimants and owners can both take heart from this case; the most any litigant can ask for at the start of a case is the chance to lay out his or her story and argue the case. 

As with any trial, however, there is always a winner and a loser.